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Let me begin with something that Jamie Boyle wrote ten years ago in 
Intellectual Property Policy Online: A Young Person’s Guide:1 
Copyright marks the attempt to achieve for texts and other works a balance in which 
the assumption of the system is that widespread use is possible without copying. The 
relative bundles of rights of the user and the owner achieve their balance based on a 
set of economic and technical assumptions about the meaning of normal use. 
For our purposes, I would like to generalize this as something that Boyle might 
have written if he had not in that particular essay been talking about RAM 
(random access memory) copies: “Copyright marks the attempt to achieve for 
texts and other works a balance in which the assumption of the system is that 
widespread use is possible without [infringing].” The copyright model is based 
on a balance between uses copyright owners are entitled to control and other 
uses they simply are not entitled to control. 
I don’t think that any of the policies underlying copyright would be 
undermined if the uses that Professor Tushnet describes2 were on the “no 
copyright owner control” side of that line. Fan creations are usually good for 
business. Star Trek was just one of a bunch of TV series canceled for poor 
ratings,3 until some women got together at science-fiction conventions and 
started exchanging home-made Star Trek short stories based on the premise 
that Kirk and Spock were lovers.4 Fan fiction, fan art, and a generation of 
people who attended science-fiction conventions to dress up in Klingon 
costumes5 gave Star Trek a second life that was far more commercially 
 
Copyright © 2007 by Jessica Litman. Anyone may make verbatim copies of this article for 
noncommercial purposes so long as the following notice is retained on all publicly distributed copies: 
© 2007 Jessica Litman. Originally published in Symposium, Cultural Environmentalism @ 10, 
70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (James Boyle & Lawrence Lessig, eds., Spring 2007). Licensed 
under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License.  To view a 
copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ or send a letter to 
Creative Commons, 543 Howard Street, 5th Floor, San Francisco, California, 94105, USA. 
     This article is also available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/lcp. 
 * Professor of Law, University of Michigan. I would like to thank Jon Weinberg, whose insights 
and suggestions greatly improved this comment. 
 1. 10 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 47, 56 (1996). 
 2. See Rebecca Tushnet, Payment in Credit: Copyright Law and Subcultural Creativity, 70 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 135 (Spring 2007). 
 3. (Although it seemed to have a perpetual life in syndication to the cheapest TV broadcaster in 
any given town.) 
 4. See JOANNA RUSS, MAGIC MOMMAS, TREMBLING SISTERS, PURITANS AND PERVERTS 80–99 
(1985); Kirk/Spock, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kirk/Spock (last visited Sept. 27, 2006). 
 5. If references to “Kirk,” “Spock,” and “Klingon” seem like gibberish to you, you can find 
innumerable books and websites to introduce you to the basics of the Star Trek universe. A Google 
search for “Kirk Spock Klingon” turns up 248,000 results. I would suggest that you consult SAM 
RAMER, THE JOY OF TREK (1997), but you would have difficulty getting your hands on a copy.  Mr. 
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successful than the first. Paramount built the remnants of Star Trek into a 
multimillion-dollar franchise initially on the backs of creative fans.6 Similarly, 
fans who continued to try to live in the Star Wars universe for a generation after 
the Return of the Jedi gave George Lucas the audience base he needed to foist 
on us three Star Wars prequels,7 Jar Jar Binks,8 a universe of flimsy plastic toys,9 
and $100 replica light sabers in your choice of Jedi colors.10 Why not, then, allow 
fannish creativity to blossom without limit? 
I suspect that many people feel uncomfortable with the idea of allowing fan 
creations to multiply without restraint. If J.K. Rowling wants to say “no sexually 
explicit Harry Potter fan fiction or fan art,”11 or George Lucas wants to say “no 
Star Wars fan fiction or art except when you’re signed on to the official 
Lucasfilm web site,”12 or Steven Spielberg wants to say, “No E.T. fan fiction, 
period,” we figure they are within their rights, since Harry Potter, Star Wars, 
and E.T. are, after all, their creations. 
But they aren’t; not entirely. They also result from the active collaboration 
of fans. We haven’t come up with a good way to think about the interests that 
fans—and other readers, viewers, listeners and users—have in the contributions 
they’ve made to their experiences of copyrighted works, although you do see 
those interests popping up in the very occasional case.13 Copyright scholars spill 
a lot of ink on the public interest, but almost all of us are guilty of having given 
reader and listener interests short shrift in our work. Certainly, that’s something 
that I’m guilty of. We have focused so hard on the idea that copyright is an 
incentive for authors and publishers that it is almost as if we thought that we 
 
Ramer, who authored the book, neglected to get Paramount Pictures’ permission. Paramount decided 
to bite the hands that feed it, and sued Mr. Ramer and his publisher for copyright infringement, 
persuading the court to enter an injunction prohibiting the manufacture, publication, or sale of the 
book. See Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Carol Publ’g Group, 11 F. Supp. 2d 329, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), 
aff’d, 181 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 6. See, e.g., JOAN MARIE VERBA, BOLDLY WRITING: A TREKER FAN AND ZINE HISTORY 1967–
1987 (2d ed. 2003). 
 7. STAR WARS EPSIODE I: THE PHANTOM MENACE (1999); STAR WARS EPISODE II: ATTACK 
OF THE CLONES (2002); STAR WARS EPISODE III: REVENGE OF THE SITH (2005). This is not to 
mention the multiple television spin-offs and Star Wars video games.  See Internet Movie DataBase, 
Search results for “Star Wars,” http://www.imdb.com/find?s=all&q=star+wars (last visited Sept. 27, 
2006). 
 8. See Star Wars Databank: Binks, Jar Jar, http://www.starwars.com/databank/character/ 
jarjarbinks/index.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2006). 
 9. See, e.g., Toy Wiz, Star Wars Toys & Action Figures, Light Sabers, Miniatures & More at Toy 
Wiz!, http://www.toywiz.com/starwarcarga.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2006). 
 10. See Star Wars Force FX Light Sabers, Think Geek, http://www.thinkgeek.com/geektoys/ 
warfare/69de/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2006). 
 11. See Darren Waters, Rowling Backs Fan Fiction, BBC News Online (May 27, 2004) 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/arts/3753001.stm (last visited Nov. 18, 2006). 
 12. See Star Wars Welcome: Terms of Use, http://www.starwars.com/welcome/about/ 
copyright.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2006). 
 13. In Lotus v. Borland, 49 F.3d 807, 821 (1st Cir. 1995) (Boudin, J., concurring), aff’d by an equally 
divided court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996), for instance, Judge Boudin was concerned about user-written 
macros. In Nintendo of America v. Lewis Galoob Toys, 780 F. Supp. 1283, 1291–98 (N.D. Cal. 1991), 
aff’d, 964 F.2d 965 (1992), the trial court felt it was important to preserve the consumer’s interest in 
modifying games. 
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could achieve the “Progress of Science” just by filling up some stockroom 
somewhere with lots of works of authorship. Recently, it seems as if many of us 
have had a similar “aha!” moment and recognized that we have been 
undervaluing the central place that readers and listeners play in the copyright 
scheme.14 After all, in order for the creation and dissemination of works of 
authorship to promote the progress of anything, people need to read, look at, 
listen to, watch, and use them. We have not been paying enough attention to 
the fact that contemporary incentive-based theories of copyright have tended to 
knock readers and listeners out of the picture frame. 
Theorizing copyright primarily in terms of author incentives looks primarily 
at the law’s effects on authors and distributors, and relegates the readers, 
listeners, and viewers of the world to the ghetto of fair use. I am less optimistic 
than Professor Tushnet that fair use is capacious enough to be able to do a good 
job, even for the authors of fan fiction, fan art, and fan video. In its current 
form, it cannot possibly answer the legitimate claims of readers, listeners, and 
viewers of other sorts. Fair use is much too busy protecting The Wind Done 
Gone15 and trying to figure out what to do with Google Book Search16 to be able 
to support the copyright interests of millions of everyday readers, listeners, and 
viewers. 
Tushnet reminds us that “[c]ase law is not all that matters,”17 and urges us to 
pay more attention to “the choices people make about copyright on a daily 
basis.”18 She explores media fandom as one example of an information ecology 
with something to teach us about copyright law’s effects on creativity. Tushnet 
describes fandom as developing a common-property-like regime, in which 
intellectual property rights are shared among members of fan communities.19 
The common-property regime is implicitly understood to be adverse to the 
rights of the owners of intellectual property in the original creations that are the 
subjects of fan creativity. That is, the owners of the copyrights in the original 
Star Trek, Star Wars, Harry Potter, and Superman works are, fans assume, 
probably entitled to control fan works, but they have not for the most part 
insisted on exercising that control.20 The common property Tushnet describes 
thus subsists at the sufferance of major commercial copyright owners, at best 
 
 14. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347 
(2005); Joseph Liu, Copyright Law’s Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REV. 397 (2003). 
 15. See, e.g., SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 16. See McGraw Hill Cos. v. Google, No. 05 CV 8881 (S.D.N.Y. filed  Oct. 15, 2005); Authors 
Guild v. Google, No. 05 CV 8136 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 20, 2005); Jonathan Band, The Google Print 
Library Project: A Copyright Analysis, available at http://www.policybandwidth.com/ 
doc/googleprint.pdf. 
 17. See Tushnet, supra note 2, at 140. 
 18. Id. at 134. 
 19. See id. at 151–55. 
 20. See id. at 138–39.  
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occupying the limbo of property potentially subject to adverse possession or 
prescriptive easement.21 
Copyright law gives us tools we can use to treat fannish creativity the way 
we might like to: we could treat fannish creations as implicitly authorized 
derivative works. The implicit authorization flows from releasing a work in the 
mass media for which the buzz generated by fannish activity is likely to mean a 
huge increase in the bottom line, and the terms of the implied license are 
roughly speaking the terms set by the fannish norms Tushnet lays out in her 
paper. If J.K. Rowling, George Lucas, and Steven Spielberg want to vary the 
terms of the implied-in-fact license, they could do so easily, by making public 
announcements of their variances. 
Analyzing fan activity through the lens of implied license solves the 
prescriptive-easement problem too, since copyright owners’ permission defeats 
any claim to have acquired a right to engage in fannish creativity through 
prescription. Implied license theories thus allow us to permit fan activity 
without undermining the core understanding that the copyright owner is 
entitled to decide whether or not to allow fans to engage in creative 
embroidery. 
Taming fannish creativity by seizing on its contribution to the copyright 
owners’ bottom line, though, is troubling because it treats fan activity as 
exceptional. Tushnet’s essay cautions us to avoid facile generalizations. We 
should not, she insists, easily assume that the fan community shares the same 
interests and norms as librarians or documentary filmmakers.22 Media fandom 
may be a sui generis ecology. It is difficult to ignore the possibility, though, that 
fandom, as Tushnet describes it, might be the vanguard of a new and 
increasingly widespread copyright headache, as individuals combine the raw 
material of commercial mass-media entertainment with their own creativity and 
post the result on the web for the enjoyment of millions of their online buddies. 
The burgeoning popularity of Internet sites like YouTube,23 the explosion of 
personal blogs,24 the expansion of online communities like MySpace.com into 
film, music, and video,25 and the increasingly blatant efforts of mainstream 
media to harness the power of amateur promotion to create buzz for their 
 
 21. Cf. Gee v. CBS, 471 F. Supp. 600, 657 (E.D. Pa.) (finding that Columbia Records’ possession of 
the recordings of Bessie Smith satisfies the requirements for common-law adverse possession), aff’d, 
612 F.2d 572 (3d Cir. 1979). 
 22. See Tushnet, supra note 2, at 145.  
 23. YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2007). See Fred Von Lohmann, 
YouTube’s Balancing Act: Making Money, Not Enemies, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, ESQ., July 10, 2006, 
http://www.hollywoodreporteresq.com/thresq/spotlight/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1002802746. 
 24. See Felicia R. Lee, Survey of the Blogosphere Finds 12 Million Voices, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 
2006, at B3. 
 25. Myspace, http://www.myspace.com/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2007). One can find on MySpace.com 
both advertising for mainstream commercial films and music and subscriber-created clips. The concept 
appears to be that major film studios and record labels have concluded that associating their release 
with MySpace.com will give it desirable buzz. 
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works26 suggest that the issues posed by media fandom may soon implicate a 
much larger slice of the Internet. Fandom may be a harbinger of a new 
explosion of noncommercial, but very public, dissemination of amateur 
derivative works incorporating the copyrighted expression of others. 
Potentially, the way we think about fandom will influence the way we treat 
large numbers of twenty-first century readers, listeners, and viewers. 
As a normative matter, I find it an ominous sign that we need to rely on 
implied license to permit fannish behavior and lots of behavior like it. Relying 
on implied license to permit fan fiction and fan video reinforces the obvious 
negative pregnant: if it is not the sort of thing copyright owners have a clear 
interest in permitting, copyright law should not allow it. Much creative 
interaction with works of authorship will lack fandom’s obvious contribution to 
the bottom line. A home video posted on YouTube.com is unlikely to substitute 
for a ticket to Pirates of the Caribbean: Dead Man’s Chest, but it may so amuse 
viewers that they decide they do not have the time to watch a 180-minute 
movie. It is not at all clear, however, that the policies underlying copyright 
should encourage only copyright-owner-authorized creativity. We cannot make 
appropriate decisions about whether incursions on copyright-owner control of 
the ways their works are read, heard, seen, and played ought to be actionable 
without considering the value of the uses as well as the degree of the invasion. 
My argument is that by ignoring the central importance of readers, listeners, 
viewers, and players in the copyright scheme, we have all but conceded that the 
essential policy question in determining whether a use of copyrighted material 
should be lawful is the way the use looks from the viewpoint of the copyright 
owner. The comfort level supplied by an implied license analysis is emblematic 
of our failure to pay enough attention to reader interests. We need to take 
another look at copyright, keeping the significance of readers, listeners, and 
viewers in mind. When we ignore their role in the copyright scheme, we are left 
with a copyright law that seems, for good reason, to be out of kilter. 
Authors (and author-centric copyright scholars) who pay attention to 
readers, listeners, and viewers tend to be most comfortable with an image of the 
reader-listener-viewer as a passive sponge. The author creates, the publisher 
disseminates, and the reader-listener-viewer forks over appropriate payment 
and passively soaks it all up. When pressed, we admit that reading is often an 
activity requiring a fair amount of creativity. (That is one reason we encourage 
our children to read rather than watch television or play videogames.) Different 
readers of Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone27 will envision the characters 
differently. When Warner Brothers turns the book into a major motion picture, 
viewers will disagree about whether Chris Columbus has captured or butchered 
 
 26. See Elinor Mills, Advertisers Look to Grassroots Marketing, C|NET News.com, Apr. 4, 2006, 
http://news.com.com/2102-1024_3-6057300.html; see also Mike Yamanote, Can “Crowdsourcing” Be 
Slave Labor, C|NET Media Blog, July 18, 2006, http://news.com.com/2061-10802_3-6095563.html. 
 27. J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE SORCERER’S STONE (1998). 
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the book characters.28 Listening, viewing, and playing can engage the 
imagination in comparable ways. If copyright is designed to encourage listening, 
viewing, and playing—and if it is not, it is curious that it confers protection on 
works designed to be listened to, viewed, or played—we presumably want 
individuals to bring the same creativity to their listening, viewing, and playing 
that we assume they bring to their reading. 
Our collective failure to pay sufficient attention to the interests of readers, 
listeners, and viewers is especially damaging to the overall fabric of copyright 
law, because in the past two decades we have acquiesced in two large, non-
statutory expansions of copyright rights at the expense of reader and listener 
rights. Those expansions, taken together, are a lot more dangerous than the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act.29 First, we have accepted, indeed in some 
cases promoted, an expansive literal reading of the copyright act under which 
every use of a copyrighted work is either licensed, subject to a statutory 
exemption, or infringing.30 This is another unfortunate product of the impulse to 
generalize that Tushnet critiques in her paper.31 Copyright law is increasingly 
complicated, and the temptation to compress it into something formulaic and 
easy to communicate is strong. Section 106 means what it says, we tell our 
students. Any reproduction, creative alteration, or distribution, any 
performance or display outside of the home, we tell them, is copyright 
infringement unless it comes within some statutory or judge-made exception. 
We are even kind of gleeful at the implausible results that follow from the 
premise. “That’s how the statute sets things up,” we say, as if our hands were 
tied. 
But this expansive literal meaning is not so well established as the 
characterization implies. That reading of section 106 is neither one Congress 
intended for the statute, nor one reflected in a large number of actual court 
 
 28. Compare Caitlin Bell, Wild About Harry; Magic in the Air, BUFFALO NEWS, Nov. 13, 2001, at 
N6 (“The movie follows the exact plot of the book, condensed into a thrilling ride through a world no 
Muggle (non-wizard) has seen. The book came to life in the cast of old and new, handpicked with help 
from Rowling herself. . . . Dame Maggie Smith as thin-lipped Professor McGonagall; Ian Hart as the 
trembling Professor Quirrell and Alan Rickman as Professor Snape, are those who Harry Potter 
readers will think jumped right from Rowling’s imagination.”), with Rory L. Aronsky, If You Liked 
Harry Potter Book, Skip the Film, FORT LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL,  Nov. 23, 2001 (Broward Metro 
Edition) at 102 (“As for the adult actors, here’s a short version: Maggie Smith as McGonagall? She 
completely lacks what Minerva McGonagall stands for. . . . Alan Rickman? Snape has nastiness in the 
book, but Rickman just presents him as a looming character (the camera looks up at him at times) and 
speaks his lines like a drone.”). 
 29. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). See, e.g., Fred 
von Lohmann, Measuring the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Against the Darknet: Implications for 
the Regulation of Technological Protection Measures, 24 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 635, 641 (2004); 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, Unintended Consequences: Seven Years Under the DMCA (Apr. 2006), 
http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/DMCA_unintended_v4.pdf. 
 30. See, e.g., David L. Hayes, Application of Copyright Rights to Specific Acts on The Internet, 
COMPUTER LAWYER, Aug. 1998, at 1; MARK LEMLEY, Dealing with Overlapping Copyrights on the 
Internet, 22 DAYTON L. REV. 547 (1997); Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise and Legislative 
History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 883–84 (1987). 
 31. See Tushnet, supra note 2, at 136. 
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decisions. Rather, it is a construct drawn by connecting the dots represented by 
controversial holdings in some cases,32 with dots designated by broad (and I 
would argue ill-considered) language in others.33 Sometimes, this sort of claim is 
a rhetorical device to demonstrate the over-breadth of existing copyright 
rights.34 Sometimes, it may derive at least in part from what I have characterized 
elsewhere as “copyright luncheon circle law,” legal theories that evolve during 
meetings of the members of the copyright bar. 
Other times, though, those who advance this expansive literal interpretation 
do so because they believe that the statutory language mandates such a reading. 
This belief is especially curious because the same folks are usually completely 
competent to construe a statute sensibly so long as they are talking about some 
other statute. Section 32 of the Lanham Act, for example, says explicitly that if 
a trademark registrant has a certificate of incontestability (which is available to 
any trademark registrant who files the requisite affidavit of continuous use five 
years following its trademark registration), the registration is “conclusive 
evidence of . . . the registrant’s exclusive right to use the registered mark in 
commerce.”35 Yet scholars and judges have no difficulty rejecting arguments 
that that language should be read to give trademark registrants the right to 
enjoin all commercial uses of the word or symbol they have registered as their 
mark.36 Giving the copyright statute this expansive reading gives section 106 a 
scope far broader than the language of the statute requires, or than the drafters 
of the 1976 Copyright Act and the Congress that enacted it intended.37 
Copyright owners, though, perceiving a need to meet the digital threat with 
strong legal weaponry, have seized on the expansive literal reading and made it 
their own. Some courts are enforcing it, and copyright scholars are questioning 
it only faintly and half-heartedly. We seem to get more of a kick from devising 
implausible applications of the broad construction than from explaining what is 
wrong with it. 
 
 32. See, e.g., Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005); MAI Sys. Corp. v. 
Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993); Intellectual Reserve v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, 75 
F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1294 (D. Utah 1999); Playboy Enterprises v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 
1993). 
 33. See, e.g., Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[C]opyrights are categorically 
immune from challenges under the First Amendment.”), aff’d sub. nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 
186 (2003); CleanFlicks v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1242 (D. Colo. 2006) (“[T]he intrinsic 
value of the right to control the content of the copyrighted work which is the essence of the law of 
copyright.”). 
 34. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Reforming Information Law in Copyright’s Image, 22 DAYTON L. 
REV. 587, 605–06 (1997), James Boyle, Sold Out, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1996, at 15 ; Lemley, supra note 
30. 
 35. The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (2000). 
 36. See, e.g., K.P. Permanent Makeup v. Lasting Impression, 543 U.S. 111 (2004); Gibson Guitar 
Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, 423 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 37. See Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29 (1994). 
Nor is there something exceptional about copyright laws that indicates they are meant to be read more 
literally than statutes on other subjects. The 1909 Copyright Act defined copyright-owner exclusive 
rights with comparable breadth, compare 1909 Copyright Act § 1 with 17 U.S.C. § 106, but courts easily 
inferred limitations and exceptions, which later Congresses approved. 
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Second, we have failed to prevent the expansion of the individual 
enumerated copyright rights until they, together, seem to coalesce into a 
general-use right.  This is also an extra-legislative development. Congress has 
had nothing to do with it; rather, litigants persuaded courts and some 
commentators that section 106 rights should be broader than previously 
understood. Copyright owners have convinced courts that reproducing in copies 
includes looking at, at least in a digital realm,38 and are currently trying hard to 
persuade courts that distributing copies to the public includes having a copy 
that is available for copying.39 With a huge expansion of that sort, implied 
license is not going to make much of a dent. 
To resist that encroachment, we need something to push back with. We’ve 
tried relying on “Too big is bad,” and on “Copyright law is all about balance,” 
without much success.40 Recalling that readers, listeners, and viewers have 
central importance in the copyright scheme and that we want them to be able to 
interact with works of authorship as well as to  absorb them passively reminds 
us of why we need to push back and gives us a tool to do so. There may even be 
some payoff from resistance. Non-statutory expansions are sometimes easier 
than statutory ones to undo.41 
Tushnet’s fan communities may seem like exceptional readers, listeners, and 
viewers, with exceptional needs. Although fans in these communities interact 
with works in exceptionally visible ways, I would argue that the creativity they 
bring to viewing, listening, and reading is very much like the creativity that 
other, less visible viewers, listeners, and readers bring to viewing, listening, and 
reading, and that that creativity is something copyright should encourage. I 
 
 38. See Intellectual Reserve v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1294 (D. Utah 
1999). 
 39. See, e.g., In re Napster Copyright Litigation, 377 F. Supp. 2d 796, 802–05 (N.D. Cal. 2005); 
Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 15–20, Electra Entm’t Group v. Barker, No. 
05-CV7430 (KMK) (THK) (Jan. 24, 2006). 
 40. I was recently reminded of how little impact copyright scholars have had on the world outside 
of academia. Henry Hotbaczewski, general counsel of Reed Elsevier and a distinguished IP lawyer, 
gave a lecture last November to the Washington, D.C. chapter of the Copyright Society of the USA. He 
used his podium to alert fellow members of the copyright bar to a new and troubling threat to copyright 
that he had first discovered only months earlier: Unaccountably, suddenly, and improperly, a large 
number of copyright law professors had taken the position that copyright protection should be 
weakened, and had even filed amicus briefs to that effect. See Henry Horbaczewski, Copyright Under 
Siege: Some Thoughts of a Publisher’s Counsel: The Sixth Annual Christopher A. Meyer Memorial 
Lecture, 53 J. COPYR. SOC’Y 387, 393 (2006). Obviously, Mr. Horbaczewski and his audience have not 
been reading our stuff. 
 41. See, e.g., Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox Film, 540 U.S. 806 (2003) (rejecting cases reading 
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act to include an attribution right); Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Telephone Co., 
506 U.S. 984 (1992) (rejecting cases giving copyright protection to facts). See generally Jane C. 
Ginsburg, The Author’s Name as a Trademark: A Perverse Perspective on the Moral Right of 
“Paternity”?, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. REV. 379 (2005) (criticizing DaStar); Jane C. Ginsburg, No 
Sweat? Copyright and Other Protection for Works of Information After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 
COLUM. L. REV. 338 (1992) (criticizing Feist). See also Moseley v. V Secret Catalog, 537 U.S. 418 (2003) 
(rejecting judicial expansion of trademark dilution to include likelihood of dilution); Walmart v. 
Samara, 529 U.S. 205 (2000) (rejecting trade-dress protection for inherently distinctive product 
designs). 
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would even claim, properly understood, that much of that creativity is 
something copyright already does encourage.42 
To reach this understanding we need to remember that copyright was never 
intended to be a general-use right. Rather, Congress designed statutory 
copyright as a collection of enumerated, individually bounded, exclusive rights. 
Supporters of cultural environmentalism need to defend the borders of the 
territory that is not within those boundaries. We need to do this by developing 
much more robust language, theories, and stories about the rights of readers, 
listeners, and viewers. We need to gather a more compelling collection of 
justifications for the borders between controlled and uncontrolled uses of 
copyrighted works. 
Copyright scholars have acquired the habit of thinking that copyright 
owners need tools to limit user activities to prevent those users from 
undermining the copyright owners’ exploitation of their works.43 Scholars 
should also be careful to recognize that copyright owner control must be 
cabined so that it does not unduly threaten reader, listener, and viewer 
enjoyment of those works.44 I don’t claim that devising appropriate limits will be 
straightforward. In a world in which technology enables consumers to engage in 
creative, massively shared interaction with and on works of authorship, figuring 
out how and where copyright law should locate the line between infringing 
exploitation and non-infringing enjoyment will be a major challenge. But in 
making the determination, we need to focus on the historic liberties of readers, 
listeners, and viewers as well as on the rights of authors and publishers. Both 
the Progress of Science and the integrity of copyright law are likely to be 
furthered by encouraging readers, listeners, and viewers to experience works 
with imagination and creativity. 
 
 42. See Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript on 
file with author). 
 43. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, From Having Copies to Experiencing Works: The Development of 
an Access Right in U.S. Copyright Law, 50 J. COPYR. SOC’Y. 113 (2003). 
 44. See, e.g., Julie Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1089 (1998). 
